The Curtain Lifts with Scientia at Stage-Center

I shall tell you something that may serve as a guide in life: There is in nature what is within reach and what is beyond reach. Ponder this well and with respect. A great deal is already gained if we impress this general fact upon our mind, even though it always remains difficult to see where the one ends and the other begins. -- Goethe¹

The Ones Who Voice Caution

Today's molecular biologists represent some of the strongest champions of a vision of truth based on the scientific method. By following their ideal of rational, objective thinking as they probe life's molecules, they have achieved impressive, even awesome successes, in their drive to redesign life by manipulating the genes. One of the most ambitious programs taken on by these scientists is the Human Genome Project (HGP), the government-funded research to sequence all the DNA in the human chromosomes. The Project is expected to provide a vast store of knowledge about what is inherited via the genes. Nobel Prize winner James Watson, who is also a past director of the HGP, is very enthusiastic about its outcome:

When finally interpreted, the genetic messages encoded within our DNA molecules will provide the ultimate answers to the chemical underpinnings of human existence.²

With a similar sense of optimistic certainty about the HGP, Walter Gilbert-- another Nobel laureate and a developer of methods for sequencing genes--praises it for what will be revealed about what makes us human.³ He refers to the human genome as the "Holy Grail" of genetics.⁴ Moreover, he trusts that knowledge of the sequence will be the ultimate response to the ancient adage "Know thyself."⁵

Yet, with all the acclaim, not everybody is convinced. Even some of the strongest advocates for the "new genetics" warn of complex dilemmas and caution against its irresponsible use. In fact, it was the molecular biologists themselves who first called for a Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee to regulate recombinant DNA research.⁶ And more recently, it was Watson--while still the first director of the HGP--who stressed how society must learn to use the human DNA sequence for beneficial purposes.⁷ By funding the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) project to support research and develop policy recommendations for the uses of DNA data, he successfully averted misgivings about an approach to the HGP, that might otherwise have appeared to be indifferent to how the data would be used.⁸ But these are not the only scientists who have voiced concern.

In Assessing Genetic Risks, the National Academy of Science (NAS) appraises both the promises and problems of testing humans for genes that may predispose to or cause diseases. As topics for discussion, the NAS scientists include: prenatal and newborn genetic testing, quality assurance of laboratory results, genetic counseling, genetics literacy, physician training in genetics, financing of testing services, and protection of personal rights--autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, and equanimity.⁹

Mapping Our Genes is still another instance of where scientists speak out. Here their concerns differ somewhat from the NAS and include issues like: long- term versus short-term research, ownership of data and clones, patent rights, the gap between diagnosis and therapy, changes in physician practice from holism to genetic reductionism, reproductive choices for parents, positive and negative eugenics and the eugenics of normalcy (i.e., the assurance of having at least some genes that are "normal"), perceptions of ourselves and others, and governmental control.¹⁰

The concerns expressed by these scientists tend to include issues that relate to the scientific, legal, and medical communities. Missing from their lists are the kinds of issues that have religious and spiritual implications. Some of these were discussed in 1982, when a Presidential Commission was convened at the request of religious leaders from several denominations. In its report Splicing Life, the Commission touches on its worries about scientists "who would play God" through genetic engineering¹¹ Though published well before the onset of the HGP, the report defines most of the religious questions that are usually raised in the context of engineering human DNA: the impact on human evolution, changes in the sense of personal identity, parental rights and responsibilities, and the way people view what it means to be a human being. Though the Commission supports prudent use of the technology, it concludes with the opinion that

contemporary developments in molecular biology raise issues of responsibility rather than being matters to be prohibited because they usurp powers that human beings should not possess. The Biblical religions teach that human beings are, in some sense, co-creators with the Supreme Creator.¹²

In contrast to the Presidential Commission's vision of people as "co-creators," biologists Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald express a much more wary tone in Exploding the Gene Myth.

We need to have a realistic sense of the positive contributions genetics and biotechnology can make, and of the risks inherent in the science, its application, and its commercialization. We also need to understand that biotechnology can change not only how we live but how we think of ourselves and other animals. Are living organisms machines, so that it is safe to replace a gear here and a cog there, or are we too complex for anyone to foresee the effects of genetic tinkering?¹³

To make their point, Hubbard and Wald turn to the worldly factors--rather than the divine--that will likely lead to the misuses of what scientists discover. By offering hypothetical situations, they explain the possible ways information about genes might be mishandled by scientists, physicians, employers, insurance companies, commercial interests, educators and law enforcers. The authors defend their deliberate emphasis on the "dangers" of biotechnology by claiming that they are only saying what most people usually ignore, downplay, and deny.¹⁴

But Hubbard and Wald are not alone in their doubts. Richard Levins also speaks about the effects of the worldly. He relates how commercial interests are so quick to taint scientific objectivity, perhaps especially so in connection with genetic engineering:

Among molecular biologists who are professors in universities, a large proportion are also principal scientists or principal stockholders in biotechnology companies. Technology is a major industry and a major source of hoped-for profit for venture capital. The human genome sequencing project, to the extent that it creates new technologies at public expense, will provide very powerful tools to biotechnology companies for carrying out their production of commodities for sale on the market. Moreover, the success of the project will give greater faith in the power of biotechnology to produce useful products.¹⁵

Still one more example of caution comes from geneticist Richard Lewontin who comments on why so many successful scientists want to sequence the human genome. He says:

[I]n part the answer is a rather crass one. The participation in and the control of a multibillion-dollar, 30- or 50-year research project that will involve the everyday work of thousands of technicians and lower-level scientists is an extraordinarily appealing prospect for an ambitious biologist. Great careers will be made. Nobel prizes will be given.¹⁶

It is significant to note that, even after their decades of training and experience, the biologists--the "experts"--disagree so strongly about the ramifications of the technology. The potential effects of gene diagnosis and therapy range too far afield from the basic knowledge about gene structure and function learned in science classrooms. Behavioral geneticists Dean Hamer and Peter Copeland agree. In The Science of Desire, they report on their studies of the possible role of genes in determining sexual preference of hetero- and homosexual men. They also elaborate on the controversial nature of their research and confess that they frequently wonder about the ethical consequences of their findings. The dilemmas they foresee simply cannot be addressed by the standards of objective, value-free studies with clear-cut results. As scientists, Hamer and Copeland are at a loss for answers to the moral dilemmas on the horizon, for "biology is amoral; it offers no help distinguishing between right and wrong."¹⁷ Moreover, they imply biotechnology will have a serious immoral aftermath if people do not respond appropriately to the possible effects:

Biology and genetics may not provide the principles to resolve moral issues, but they do raise moral issues of their own, especially as the technology threatens to advance beyond our ability to understand all the implications.¹⁸

In fact, when asked about the implications of his research, Hamer replied, "I don't know," following with:

I'd have to be more than just a scientist. I'd have to be a sociologist, politician, lawyer, and ethicist--not to mention a prophet, seer, and fortune-teller. It's not that I don't think about these issues and worry about the outcomes, just that I plain don't know the answers. Nor does anyone else.¹⁹

It may seem a bit foreboding when eminent scientists make remarks like these, since they stir doubts about the possible inadequacy of the current approaches to "science literacy"--the educators' answer to ethical decisionmaking about the individual and societal effects of science.²⁰ According to Hamer and Copeland, decisions about what is and is not moral can only come from the people, not from the scientists or anyone else. Personal values and beliefs will be the guides, not the facts of science.²¹

Hamer and Copeland stop short of suggesting how educators can help students learn to better use their value and beliefs to make decisions. However, the value-oriented Science-Technology-Society (STS) theme is one idea that has been around since the 1970s.²² In the context of the STS approach, science educators who teach molecular biology and its applications would immediately confront a host of controversial implications of genetic engineering. Moreover, many of the most ethically complex topics, the eugenics-related ones about human gene diagnosis and gene therapy, would be outside the typical STS curriculum. Examples of these would include: what it is to be genetically "normal" versus "abnormal," the definitions of "good gene" and "bad gene," the meaning of "genetically disabled," the legality and illegality of making our gene sequence "fingerprints" available to the public, and the human rights questions related to personal choice versus societal demands.

Indeed, to take on questions like these is to leave the traditional content of the science classroom far behind. Such subjects are more appropriate to the subjective, value- laden realm--traditionally, the humanities--where people can depend more on their philosophical and religious inclinations to respond to the moral mire of "right" versus "wrong." But even the most straight-forward dilemmas about gene therapy can be trying to the moral faculties of even the most experienced bioethicists. So what are the science teachers going to do?

Science Literacy and the Revitalization of the Humanities

These days, the most prominent trend among science literacy advocates is the one offered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in its Science for All Americans. The goal is to raise all people in America to a basic standard of scientific knowledge so they can become "informed decisionmakers"--a key phrase among science literacy proponents. The AAAS's focus on facts follows the more traditional, positivist ideal for science. However, teachers are also encouraged to promote habits of mind that foster clear and reasoned thinking, as well as values and attitudes like integrity, diligence, fairness, curiosity, openness to new ideas, skepticism, and imagination. Teachers are admonished not "to simply indoctrinate students into becoming uncritical supporters of science."²³

The AAAS's positivist bent to science literacy is also echoed by the NAS in its more specific recommendations for "genetics literacy" about topics related to molecular biology and biotechnology.²⁴ According to the Academy, genetics literacy means knowing enough basic molecular biology and genetics to make informed decisions. On referring to their literacy goals in the context of human gene therapy, the Academy scientists say:

This imperative is intended to develop a genetically literate public that understands basic biological research, understands elements of the personal and health implications of genetics, and participates effectively in public policy issues involving genetic information.²⁵

In view of the difficult subject nature of molecular biology, these are high aims-- possibly unrealistic. The real question is: What exactly must be known for someone to be literate enough to make genuinely informed decisions about DNA technology? To the Academy scientists, it means everyone must know about DNA as an information source, have a sense of value for the diversity caused by DNA, understand the interactions among the genes, the individual and the environment, and be able to join the debate about what should or should not be done with genetic engineering.²⁶ It is relatively easy to imagine a few "what if" situations that could result from the uses of gene diagnosis and therapy. For example, what if two parents want to abort a fetus simply because it lacks the genes for blue eyes? What if the military wants to use DNA sequence data to determine whether recruits are hetero- or homosexual? What if society wants to insist that people be required to have a genetic constitution for a particular skin color? What if medical professionals want to remove "defective" genes from the eggs and sperm of the population, so that all future generations will never have to experience the associated illnesses? Certainly, these are hypothetical situtations which may never occur. Still, if the science "experts" themselves fall short of having answers to these kinds of moral dilemmas, how can the nonscientific public be expected to be more prepared?

As already told, Dean Hamer's answer to this question is that each of us needs to be more than "just a scientist"--needs to go beyond knowledge based merely on basic facts. Thus, the more immediate concern is: How do people respond ethically to the uses and effects of biotechnology even if they are not genetically literate? For the social constructivists, the answer has its basis in the fact that scientists themselves cannot agree. In sharp contrast to the mainstream fact-based approach to science literacy, the constructivists contend that what most people would ever learn as factual knowledge would be far too superficial to permit informed decisions.²⁷ As an alternative, they suggest students be taught how to evaluate the quality of the motives and values out of which the scientists and others develop and use the technology. According to this version of science literacy, people would have to be in touch with the broader, nonscientific factors, both personal and cultural, that influence what biotechnologists do. How to teach in this style is taken up by Bingle and Gaskell.²⁸

One of the first attempts to introduce students to bioethics in the context of the HGP is given in Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy.²⁹ Backed by the HGP's ELSI project, the authors blend ethics into the factual, scientific content by including a section on "Ethical and Public Policy Dimensions of the Human Genome Project." The module covers three major topic areas: the principles of ethics, how to talk about personal interests, and the role of argument in ethical inquiry. Following these guidelines, students are presented with activities based on hypothetical dilemmas related to the HGP. The manual is relatively new, so how students eventually apply what they learn about ethics remains to be seen--hypothetical situations are not the same as reality-based, personal experience. It is also questionable whether such a brief exposure to ethics will be enough to encourage freely-made, personal choices by students or simply bring them to parrot the moral biases of their teachers and the manual.

With all the talk about people making decisions about people, there is an additional consideration which must inevitably be taken into account. It could be phrased as the question: What is it to be human? As more and more people wonder how to create "new" humans by moving genes around, the demand for a greater blend of the sciences and the humanities is bound to get louder. Indeed, the time seems right to try again to cross the gap between C. P. Snow's "two cultures."³⁰ Already, some of the staunchest defenders of science literacy are recommending a more general approach which begins to meet this end. For instance, in its Benchmarks for Science Literacy, the AAAS condones a society-centered core for the science curriculum. Teachers are invited to use value-oriented goals which embrace the arts and religion:

An effort should be made to help students realize that insight into human behavior comes from many sources, including the biological, behavioral, and social sciences and literature, history, art, philosophy, and religion. The curriculum should deliberately provide opportunities for students to reflect on social issues from a variety of perspectives.³¹

Nevertheless, science educators are certain to find it difficult to discuss ethical dilemmas in the context of what it is to be human from these varied perspectives. The topic is not a typical part of science teacher training. Nor has it ever been a part of the science curriculum at the universtiy level. Teachers are likely to have personal opinions about biotechnology in relation to human evolution and the environment, but they may not have the personal skills to be genuinely open to all the students' diverse opinions and values. This could be especially so when the topic shifts to the cultural, religious and spiritual dimensions of students' views about human nature.

Levins and Lewontin discuss some of the expected problems in The Dialectical Biologist. In the chapter on "What is Human Nature?" they say:

There is no more vexing and confused question in biological and social theory than the issue of 'human nature.' What do we mean by human nature? Does it exist? If so, in what does it consist?³²

Bioethicist John Fletcher tries to answer these questions in Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics. He begins by likening the topic of human nature to Mark Twain's complaint "that people are always talking about the weather but they never do anything about it" and follows with:

The same is true of humanhood criteria. In biomedical ethics writers constantly say that we need to explicate humanness or humaneness, what it means to be a truly human being, but they never follow their admission of the need with an actual inventory or profile, no matter how tentatively offered. Yet this is what must be done, or at least attempted.³³

Then, Fletcher heeds his own advice and proceeds to specify what he thinks are uniquely human traits: self-awareness, minimum intelligence, self-control, sense of time, capability to relate to and show concern for others, communication, control of existence, curiosity, change, balance of rationality and feeling, idiosyncrasy and neocortical function.³⁴ To list specific traits like these might be expected of a bioethicist like Fletcher. After all, his primary interest is in the ethics of human medicine. But, for a scientist like microbiologist Robert Sinsheimer--a key figure in the conception of the HGP--to do so is more unusual. Sinsheimer's list includes: self-awareness; a sense of past, present and future; hope, love and trust; an ability to communicate and participate; a capacity for rational understanding of nature; the desire to lessen the role of fate; and a vision of human beings as unfinished.³⁵ The obscure meanings of the concepts in both lists reveal the extent to which both men are grappling with the barrier between science and the humanities.

Though scientists close to the HGP may not be as ready as Sinsheimer to give such a detailed set of qualities, the others are nevertheless aware of the importance of the topic in connection with human gene therapy. Admittedly, to be conscious of the mystery of what it is to be human is the first step. However, beyond the initial awareness, there is little if any agreement. In the opening paragraph of The Code of Codes, Kevles and Hood say the human genome is "the key to what makes us human, what defines our possibilities and limits as members of the species Homo sapiens."³⁶ Likewise, Gilbert believes the sequence information about human genes will stir pointed questions about the nature of humans, and will eventually lead to answers to: What specifies the human organism, and what makes us human?³⁷ Moreover, Watson explains how he spent his career "trying to get a chemical explanation for life, the explanation of why we are human beings and not monkeys" and concludes it is because of our DNA.³⁸

By this frequent raising of the "human nature" theme, these esteemed champions of the HGP tend to legitimize it among both their scientific peers and the public. Thereby, conversations about it will probably grow. An example of this is the way Facklemann, a writer for Science News, explains:

Scientists and ethicists routinely discuss the ethical difficulties raised by the project to map the human genome. Yet such discourse must move out of the realm of academia. Society must weigh in on the debate, as it touches nearly every aspect of what it will mean to be human in the next century.³⁹

The Proverbial Conversation about Nature and Nurture

As the public debate about science-related issues spills into the humanities--and the humanities mix more with the sciences--people will most likely again give attention to the relative roles of nature (genes) and nurture (environment) in the context of being human. Evelyn Fox Keller points out that, although genes play a role in making us human, the debate about "nature versus nurture" roars on. She suggests it is not so much a matter of nature or nurture, but more about the degree to which each contributes.⁴⁰ Keller believes many people speak to the importance of both nature and nurture, but "rhetorically, as well as in scientific practice, it is 'nature' that emerges as the decisive victor."⁴¹ This troubles her, because it does not give proper emphasis to the nonheriditary influences.

Geneticist Lewontin makes a similar observation about HGP scientists and claims they

explicitly reject an absolute genetic determinism, but they seem to be writing more to acknowledge theoretical possibilities than out of conviction. If we take seriously the proposition that the internal and external codetermine the organism, we cannot really believe that the sequence of the human genome is the grail that will reveal to us what it is to be human, that it will change our philosophical view of ourselves, that it will show how life works.⁴²

Richard Dawkins, author of The Selfish Gene, presents a strong case for the role of genes in genetic determinism, but he also says there is no place for morality in an evolutionary process determined only by genes. For him, to conceive of the process as solely dependent on heredity and to live life according to this idea is a mistake:

My own feeling is that a human society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. ... Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.⁴³

Interestingly, he concludes that we must work to understand what genes are up to, because "we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something which no other species has ever aspired to."⁴⁴ On the one hand, Dawkins seems to be opening the window a bit further to what people can do to remodel themselves by changing the physical structure of the DNA. Yet, he clearly supports those who argue for the powerful influences of parents, siblings, education, society, and culture. Missing from Dawkins' account is any role for a human spirit.

Keller also comments about how the nature-nurture question interweaves with personal freedom and autonomy.⁴⁵ These topics are blooming into some of the most critical issues surrounding the ethics of human gene diagnosis and therapy. More and more, doctors are becoming aware of these issues, especially in pluralistic societies like the United States and Europe where so much emphasis is placed on human individuality. Concerns about personal responsibility will likely grow as additional options become available for treating diseases with gene manipulation. One of the chief conflicts will be between private choice and the common good?⁴⁶ Many worry that every person's own genetic constitution will become the basis for categorizing and identifying each in the name of social necessity, thereby compromising individual privacy. Already, commercial and governmental interests are primed to use--if not already using--the information for financial and social benefits at the expense of personal rights.⁴⁷

Keller also believes future perceptions of the etiology of disease will probably depend on how people conceive the role of genes as the determinants of their personal well- being. She suggests that the conceptual shift to the dominance of nature may have already occurred. Along with the known gene-determined disorders, the term "genetic disease" is also being used in reference to gene defects for which no known disorders exist, as well as disorders which may not have a genetic basis or may not even be diseases. As Keller also explains, the concept of "genetic disease" also implies a base-line "normal" sequence in the DNA which is to be found in "normal" individuals.⁴⁸

Such thoughts about genes and DNA lead inevitably to the "eugenics of normalcy" that is described in Mapping Our Genes. The expression refers to the use of genetic information both to remove incapacitating conditions and to ensure that "each individual has at least a modicum of normal genes."⁴⁹ Here, Keller is bothered by the lack of any explanation for what is meant by "modicum of normal genes." One of the biggest quandaries will be to interpret the term "normalcy" in view of the many differences between the DNA sequences of any two individuals. Even a consensus sequence based on genomes from many people of different races and cultures would not suffice, for this would evade what it is be a "normal" individual.⁵⁰ Keller says:

[T]he distinction that had earlier been made by the demarcation between culture and biology (or between nurture and nature) is now made by a demarcation between the normal and the abnormal; the force of destiny is no longer attached to culture, or even to biology in general, but rather more specifically to the biology (or genetics) of disease. Far from teaching us "what it means to be human," in actual practice, the burden of the new human genetics turns on the elucidation not of human order but of human disorder. Our genes may make us "what we are," but, it would appear, they do so more forcefully for some of us than for others. By general consensus, molecular geneticists do not seek genetic loci for traits that they--and we--accept as normal. Indeed, they, like us, do not even seek to define the meaning of "normal."⁵¹

Keller predicts the concepts of "normal" and "health" will continue to elude definition and take second place to definitions for "disease" and "unhealth." Moreover, with these terms will come a series of nebulous labels for the qualities of genes and the individuals carrying these genes. Examples of these are: "good" and "bad" genes, "desirable" and "undesirable" traits, and "wanted" and "unwanted" characteristics. While the eugenicists of the 1900's sought improvement in humanity's collective gene pool, the "new eugenicists" will highlight the quality of each individual's genes. As people become accustomed to an acceptable, contemporary notion of "perfecting" humans, the old eugenics will be disguised and flourish as the individual's "inalienable right to health."⁵² Keller expects this shift will put greater demands on the individual to make personal choices about one's own genetic profile and those of one's children.

It is perhaps inevitable that the appeal to the desire for health translates into a search for the genetic basis of unhealth, but the net effect of this translation is that the nature of normality is allowed silently to elude the gaze of genetic scrutiny--and thereby tacitly to evade its determinist grip. The freedom molecular biology promises to bring is the freedom to rout the domain of destiny inhering in "disease-causing genes" in the name of an unspecified standard of normality--a standard that remains unexamined not simply by oversight but by the internal logic of the endeavor. The "normal" state can be specified in this endeavor only by negation--by the absence of those alleles said to cause disease.⁵³

Presently, one of the most significant impasses arising from the notion of "genetic health" is the gap between the ability to diagnose "abnormal" genes and the ability to repair the "abnormality" at the molecular level.⁵⁴ This gap is an immediate source for serious dilemmas, for it raises the specter of genetic "abnormality" without giving viable alternatives for anyone designated "abnormal." Genetic counselors are especially primed for "diagnosis without cure" issues. In Assessing Genetic Risks, the NAS devotes a chapter on "Issues in Genetic Counseling" to address the subtleties faced by counselors who have so little to offer in the way of remedial action for most "defective" traits.⁵⁵ In face of the shortage of options, "'treatment' is at best a long-term goal, and 'prevention' means preventing the births of individuals diagnosed as genetically aberrant--in a word, it means abortion."⁵⁶

With dismal prospects for the development of "cures" for gene "anomalies," Keller thinks informed decisionmaking is not possible. After all, to keep or abort the fetus offers little choice. Moreover, as more options are available,

newly available choices, though ostensibly made by individuals, are in fairly obvious ways preconstructed by the categories of disease already presented to the decisionmaker, often on the basis of rather dubious evidence.⁵⁷

By "dubious evidence," she means the confusion generated by scientists who first publish and then retract conclusions that attribute specific genetic loci to illnesses like schizophrenia, manic depression, and alcoholism. Such bewilderment adds to the near impossibility of informed decisionmaking, even among scientists. The ultimate paradox for informed decisionmaking surfaces when the concept of genetic determinism is pushed to the extreme for certain conditions. If someone is considered "mentally incompetent," then the only possible conclusion is that the person is "genetically incapable" of making responsible choices.⁵⁸ Such arguments intensify the spiralling cloud of value-laden enigmas that weave throughout the logic of DNA-thinking, and Keller is quite skilled at bringing them out.

In "Genetic Technology and Reproductive Choice: An Ethics for Autonomy," feminist ethicist Ruth Cowan further explores the consequences when abortion is the only alternative for "treating" a "genetically defective" fetus.⁵⁹ Cowan suggests that feminist ethics offers another alternative for women who are faced with the abortion option:

A feminist nonnormative ethicist might assert that some of women's life experiences are different from men's, particularly those that have to do with pregnancy. As a result women face moral dilemmas that are different from the ones men face and they have developed moral principles-- still largely unarticulated--that are different from men's.⁶⁰

For her, the essential difference between men and women in this context is the woman's nurturing quality: unless nurtured, an embryo cannot mature into an adult. Since it is the mother's responsibility to ensure this process, the pregnant woman should also have sole control over whether to abort a "defective" fetus. It should be a fully autonomous choice.

For when left free to decide, most women decide to abort for reasons that have to do with their sense of good nurturance: for example, when they feel either that this is not a time when they can nurture a child properly or this is not the fetus that will grow into a child whom they can nurture properly.⁶¹

Feminist Marsha Saxton is an example of one who was faced with this very choice. In "Born and Unborn: The Implications of Reproductive Technologies for People with Disabilities," she relates her dilemma in deciding whether or not to give birth to her fetus. Herself "disabled" with spina bifida, Saxton knew the high probability that her fetus would be similarly affected. After detailing the facts and telling the step-by-step rationale for her choice, she explains her inspiration:

I hope that my children will be physically healthy and mentally able, but if they are not, I believe I can kindle in them the strength to challenge the social barriers they may meet, and reinforce in them the joy to be alive.⁶²

Is it possible that her life-long experience with the effects of a "defective" gene brought her to this insight?

Religion and Spirituality Gain More Attention

Interestingly, in his On Human Nature, sociobiologist Edward Wilson pushes the nature-nurture issue of "human nature" into the realm of religion. Here, he explores basic questions about how and why the mind works the way it does and how it relates to our ultimate nature. His thesis centers on the role of "the new naturalism" in determining the human condition. According to this view, if humankind evolved by Darwinian natural selection, the species Homo sapiens was made by genetic chance and environmental necessity, not God. Wilson suggests that to the extent this is true, it gives rise to two spiritual dilemmas: "that no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created by its genetic history" and "that morality evolved as instinct."⁶³

According to scientific materialist Wilson, if natural selection determined the evolution of the human brain, the ability to make choices between aesthetic judgments and religious beliefs must also have arisen by the same mechanistic process. Thus, for him everything about human beings, including values, morals, religion, and spirituality, has a foundation in physical phenomenons. There is no place for a transcendental deity. Cautiously, he assumes:

If that perception is correct, science may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and meaning of human values, from which all ethical pronouncements and much of political practice flow.⁶⁴

Wilson also points out how religious belief has become such a complex and powerful force for people--an aspect that probably will not be eradicated from human nature.⁶⁵ For even in the United States, history's most technological and scientific society, religion still has a commanding sway.

Wilson's remark about the impact of religion is certainly true. As Dorothy Nelkin observes in "Genetics, God, and Sacred DNA," it even manifests with an ironic twist in the scientific community. She cites many instances where scientists use religious metaphors in their work, thereby aggravating the face-off between religion and science. They endow DNA with a nearly spiritual importance, as if it is a sacred object which will explain human life and fate.

[S]cientists have elevated it to the eternal and fundamental basis of human identity; indeed, DNA is treated in many ways as a secular equivalent to the Christian Soul.⁶⁶

As an example for her DNA-soul analogy, Nelkin tells how some view it as the bearer of good and evil: "A man may look fine to the outside world, but despite external appearances, if he is evil or ill, it will be marked in his soul--or in his genes."⁶⁷

Without revealing whether he has any personal ties to religion, biologist Christopher Wills actually sounds more empathetic in the way he addresses spirituality. In Exons, Introns, and Talking Genes, he begins his discussion of the soul with the opera Die Frau ohne Schatten in which Strauss portrays the souls of children in heaven, who sing out as they wait to descend into mortal bodies. Wills underscores the fact that the overwhelming majority of humanity believes this journey of the soul to be a reality. He believes this view cannot just simply be dismissed. As he puts it:

In the course of this book we have journeyed through a high-tech world in which the human genome is slowly being laid bare. We have seen that there is nothing in principle to stop us from eventually tracking down genes that influence intelligence, skills, mental health, even behavior. But there are no genes, on any of our twenty- three chromosomes, for the soul.

The gulf between those who are concentrating on the scientific implication of this research and those who see only that it menaces the essential uniqueness and divinity of human beings is certain to grow. Bridges of education and comprehension must be built across this gulf. An essential starting point is that scientists and their allies must never assume that a human being is nothing more than just a collection of genes to be poked and manipulated, for if they do they will lose the support of the majority of their fellow human beings. The mere fact that we cannot prove the existence of a soul, or assign it a chromosomal location, does not invalidate that world view.⁶⁸

His last sentence expresses the openness to be expected of a scientist who truly adheres to the ideal of objectivity and unbiased observation--one who is not willing to discount a possible reality just because it cannot be studied with the physical senses. In fact, others with a similar view have also begun to make the "bridges" about which he speaks. One instance is the conference convened by J. Robert Nelson and described in On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion:

An expanding knowledge and understanding of human life is the primary purpose of both genetic science and religious thought. Some people who are expert in one of these fields of knowledge may be ignorant of the other field and treat it with disdain. Occasionally their attitude toward their counterparts may be defensive and polemical. Even a mood of conflict and hostility, however, cannot obscure the fact that both are contending about the nature of human life.⁶⁹

Nelson explains how increasingly more people identify with, or at least raise questions about, both positions. He is positive about the outcome. He thinks a meeting between the advocates of science and those with religious beliefs and convictions may offer a constructive inquiry into how the two relate. He describes this as an extraordinary time when the boundary between the two is blurring:

It is remarkable that a space has been opened in the HGP for consideration of some profound questions of religious faith and theology. The decision may not be popular with civil libertarians who insist that the Constitution's First Amendment excludes any payment with public funds for study of religious matters, or for atheists who reject religion. But the evidence is more than sufficient to show that exploring the DNA molecule opens questions about human nature, identity, behavior, and destiny for which religious answers are most appropriate.⁷⁰

***

But by now, the unfolding of my theme has clearly moved from the domain of science and into a realm where the consideration of ethics and morality are more routine. Thus, it is time to shift to the Second Part, wherein I direct the focus to the bioethicists and philosophers who are getting involved with the molecular scientists. Scientia will return later.

Return to Contents
Back to Ifgene home page